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Abstract— Residential Demand Response has emerged as
a viable tool to alleviate supply and demand imbalances of
electricity during times when the electric grid is strained.
Demand Response providers bid reduction capacity into the
wholesale electricity market by asking their customers under
contract to temporarily reduce their consumption in exchange
for a monetary incentive. This paper models consumer behavior
in response to such incentives by formulating Demand Response
in a Mechanism Design framework. In this auction setting,
the Demand Response Provider collects the price elasticities of
demand as bids from its rational, profit-maximizing customers,
which allows targeting only the users most susceptible to
incentives such that an aggregate reduction target is reached
in expectation. We measure reductions by comparing the
materialized consumption to the projected consumption, which
we model as the “10-in-10”-baseline, the regulatory standard
set by the California Independent System Operator. Due to
the suboptimal performance of this baseline, we show, using
consumption data of residential customers in California, that
Demand Response Providers receive payments for “virtual
reductions”, which exist due to the inaccuracies of the baseline
rather than actual reductions. Improving the accuracy of the
baseline diminishes the contribution of these virtual reductions.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the restructuring of the traditional, vertically in-
tegrated energy market towards a competitive market,
Demand-Side Management (DSM) has become a viable tool
for alleviating supply and demand imbalances of electricity.
Facilitated by advancements in information and communica-
tions technology, smart metering infrastructure allows end-
users of electricity to “participate” in the electric market
as virtual power plants through properly designed incentive
mechanisms. DSM is motivated by the inelasticity of energy
supply, which causes small variations in demand to result in a
price boom or bust, respectively. These price fluctuations are
aggravated by the inherent volatility of renewable generation
resources, their increasing levels of penetration, and the
prohibitively high capital cost of energy storage. Since a
load-serving entity (LSE) is required to procure electricity
at fluctuating prices to cover the electricity demand of its
residential households under contract instantaneously and
at quasi-fixed tariffs, price risks are almost entirely borne
by the LSE. Incentivizing users to temporarily reduce their
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consumption (and charging a fee if users do not reduce)
during periods of high prices therefore partially passes such
price risks on to customers.
While the area of DSM has attracted a vast array of
research across different domains (see [1] for a summary),
we in this paper focus on the area of Demand Response
(DR), where end-users of electricity are incentivized to
reduce their demand temporarily during designated hours,
precisely when there is a shortage of electricity supply. Users
receive a reward for each unit of reduction, but incur a
penalty for increasing their consumption. Demand Response
providers (DRPs) bundle these reductions and can offer these
reductions as a bid directly into the competitive wholesale
electricity market, or enter bilateral contracts with load-
serving utilities. While DR is traditionally carried out on a
commercial level, residential customers are targeted for load
reduction programs, as well. For instance, in California, the
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) launched a “Demand
Response Auction Mechanism” (DRAM) in July 2015 [2]
to allow DRPs to offer reduction capacity from residential
customers directly into the day-ahead electricity market,
where they are subject to regular market clearing prices and
shortfall penalties. Utilities are required to purchase a fixed
minimum monthly amount of this reduction capacity.
To make an informed capacity bid into the market, the
DRP must take various factors into account, such as the
expected Locational Marginal Price (LMP) which determines
its market clearing price, the elasticity of users’ demand
given an incentive, and the number of users under contract.
If the DRP bids too much capacity, the aggregate reduction
among its user base will likely fail to reach the capacity
volume, thereby incurring a shortfall penalty; similarly, a
suboptimal revenue arises from too small a bid. The DRP can
improve its bidding strategy by learning users’ behavior in
response to incentives. However, users’ preferences are typ-
ically private information and hence unknown to the utility.
The challenge thus becomes to elicit this private information.
We cast this problem as a mechanism design problem, where
the DRP as the auctioneer solicits bids from each of its
residential customers through an incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanism. The motivation behind this
approach is to increase allocative efficiency, that is, the
utility would like to solicit reductions only from the highest
reducers, who are most willing to reduce their consumption
in exchange for the lowest possible reward. In this paper,
we design such a mechanism that fulfills these criteria
and benchmark its performance against the omniscient case,
where user characteristics are common knowledge.
A crucial question that arises from this setting is how to
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measure the reduction of any individual user during a DR
event, given that only the consumption outcome under a
treatment can be observed, but not its counterfactual (the
consumption had there been no DR event). This is the
fundamental problem of causal inference [3]. To estimate
the reduction during any particular DR event, it is thus
essential to estimate the counterfactual, which we refer to
in this context as “baseline”. Estimating this baseline in the
absence of a Randomized Controlled Trial is a modern area
of research at the intersection of economics and machine
learning. Examples for such baseline estimates can be found
in [4], [5], [6], [7]. In this paper, we employ the “10-in-
10” baseline employed by the California Independent System
Operator (CAISO) [8], which estimates the counterfactual
for a particular DR event as the mean consumption of the
10 most recent days during the same hour as the DR event.
Using this baseline, the measured reduction for any selected
user can be formulated as the sum of a virtual reduction,
which reflects the estimation error in the baseline prediction,
and the actual reduction due to price elasticity of user
demand. We observe that the DR provider can achieve a
virtual reduction from those users for which the baseline
is high. That is, the DR provider receives payments for
virtual, non-existent reductions which are indirectly paid for
by utilities. However, we show that a more accurate baseline
diminishes the impact of such virtual reductions.
Related Work
Modeling consumer behavior in response to monetary
incentives in DR and their heterogeneity is a growing area
of research. In [9], the authors formulate the problem of
targeting the “right” customers for DR as a stochastic knap-
sack problem in order to achieve a target reduction with
high probability. However, users’ responses are modeled as
a linear model without private user information.
Other works have incorporated a contractual formulation
between consumers and suppliers in DR settings. For exam-
ple, [10] designs a DR market where suppliers bid supply
curves in the presence of a supply shortage to the load-
serving entity and analyzes the ensuing market equilibria. In
[11], the authors formulate a contract between an aggregator
of buildings, individual buildings, and the wholesale elec-
tricity market to exploit flexibility of commercial buildings’
HVAC consumption. In a similar fashion, [12] formulates
a contract design problem between an aggregator and indi-
vidual electric vehicle owners to maximize its revenue by
providing power capacity to the grid operator.
To quantify the impact of DR signals on the reduction of
consumption, [6], [7] estimate individual treatment effects in
response to hourly DR events by comparing the estimated
counterfactual consumption to the actual, observed con-
sumption. [13] formulates an optimal treatment assignment
strategy to precisely measure the treatment effect of DR.
The application of Mechanism Design on DR is covered
in [14], where the authors maximize the social welfare of
consumers and the energy provider by designing a consump-
tion controller with a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction. In [15],
[16], the authors incorporate uncertainty into consumers’
reduction behavior and introduce the notion of reliability for
achieving a designated amount of aggregate reduction.
Contributions
Unlike previous works, which modeled reductions as mul-
tiples of unit reductions, we account for the Fundamental
Problem of Causal Inference [3] into the mechanism design
formulation between DRP and users, which is our main
contribution. Specifically, we estimate reductions using the
CAISO “10-in-10” baseline as the counterfactual estimate.
As a consequence of uncertain baseline predictions, virtual
reductions arise. Using observational data from residential
customers in California, we quantify the extent to which
these virtual reductions counteract DR, and how these reduc-
tions diminish as baseline estimates become more precise.
Notation
Let [ · ]+ = max(0, ·). Vectors are printed in boldface. Let
a−i denote the vector of all components in a excluding i.
1(·) denotes the indicator function.
Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II characterizes DR market participants and their
interactions, based on which Section III presents a mech-
anism for the DR provider to elicit private user information
and to achieve an aggregate reduction among its users under
contract. Section IV elucidates the difference between virtual
and actual reductions as an artifact of an uncertain baseline
estimate. The mechanism is simulated on residential smart
meter data in California in Section V, where we experimen-
tally show how more accurate baselines reduce the amount
of virtual reductions. Section VI concludes. All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
II. MARKET PARTICIPANTS AND INTERACTIONS
A. Residential Demand Response
Figure 1 describes the interaction between the DRP, end-
users, the electric utility, and the wholesale electricity market.
Electric Utility
Wholesale Market End Users
DR Provider
Payment
Electricity Incen-
tives
Reduc-
tions
Signal
Reductions
Fig. 1: Energy Market Participants for DR and their Interactions
The DRAM requires electric utilities to acquire demand
flexibility from DRPs, which they submit as part of their
supply curves as a bid into the real-time wholesale electricity
market. If these bids are cleared, the utility sends the DRP
a signal to ask for a specified aggregate reduction among its
users. The DRP elicits reductions by incentivizing a subset
of its customers T ⊆ I with user-specific per-unit rewards
{ri ∈ R+ | i ∈ T }, where I = {1, . . . , n} denotes the
set of users. In exchange for the monetary incentive, users
reduce consumption by {δi ∈ R | i ∈ T }. A per-unit
penalty q ∈ R+, which is assumed to be identical for all
users and common knowledge, is enforced for an increase in
consumption beyond the baseline. Users in the non-targeted
group I \T are excluded from the incentive program. In this
paper, we focus on the interaction between the DRP and the
end-users from the perspective of the DRP. To maximize its
profit, the goal of the DRP is to achieve an a-priori defined
aggregate reduction with minimal payments to its users.
B. Residential Customers
Each rational, profit-maximizing user i ∈ I is endowed
with the “10-in-10” baseline xˆi ∈ R+ employed by the
California Independent System Operator (CAISO) [8], which
is an estimate of her counterfactual consumption [17] for a
particular hour. For notational ease, we drop time indices, but
we emphasize the need to re-calculate xˆi for any individual
hour. The baseline for a particular hour on a weekday is
calculated as the mean of the hourly consumptions on the
10 most recent business days during the hour of interest. For
weekend days and holidays, the mean of the 4 most recent
observations is calculated. User i’s measured load reduction
δi, provided she is given incentive ri to reduce during a
particular hour, is simply the difference between the baseline
xˆi and the actual, materialized consumption xi:
δi =
{
0 , if i 6∈ T
xˆi − xi , if i ∈ T
(1)
Due to the widespread existence of advanced metering infras-
tructure, the baseline xˆi is assumed to be common knowledge
among the DRP and user i. The utility of user i is defined
as follows:
ui =
{
0 , if i 6∈ T
ri · [xˆi − xi]+ − q · [xi − xˆi]+ , if i ∈ T
(2)
which equals the payment from the DRP to user i. That is, if
the user is under a DR contract with the DRP, she is rewarded
with ri ∈ R+ for each unit of reduction, and charged q for
each unit of consumption above the baseline xˆi.
We model users’ consumption in response to ri, denoted
with xi(ri), with a semi-logarithmic demand curve, an
assumption frequently made in economics:
xi(ri) = x¯i · exp(−αiri)
log xi(ri) = log x¯i − αiri ∀ i ∈ I (3)
In (3), x¯i ∈ R+ and αi ∈ R+ are random variables signifying
the base demand (the intercept or the consumption with
ri = 0) and the slope of the demand curve in log-linear co-
ordinates, respectively. This semi-logarithmic demand curve
captures the fact that the amount of reduction is marginally
decreasing in the reward ri and saturates. User i’s type θi is
information correlated with (x¯i, αi) (not necessarily (x¯i, αi)
itself) and user i’s private information.
C. Demand Response Provider
The DRP aims to maximize its profit Π in expectation:
Π = r¯ ·min(∆,M)− q¯ · [M −∆]+
−
∑
i∈I
δi (ri · 1δi<0 − qi · 1δi≥0) . (4)
Π is random in δ1, . . . , δn. ∆ =
∑
i∈I δi is the total sum
of reductions and M ∈ R+ the target capacity the DRP has
to provide to the utility. r¯ and q¯ ∈ R+ denote the per-unit
reward and shortfall penalty the DRP is subject to in the
wholesale electricity market. Note that q¯ 6= q and r¯ 6= ri.
The first term of (4) represents the profit the DRP earns
for materialized reductions, the second term captures the
shortfall penalty for unfulfilled reductions, and the last term
is the sum of payments disbursed to individual customers.
Assumption 1. The DRP is risk-neutral and profit-
maximizing.
Assumption 2. The per-unit penalty q¯ in the wholesale
electricity market and the per-unit reward r¯ are greater than
the maximum per-unit reward disbursed to any customer, i.e.
min(q¯, r¯) > max1≤i≤n(ri).
With Assumptions 1 and 2, (4) can be rewritten as follows:
minimize
r1,...,rn
Eδ1,...,δn
[∑
i∈I
δi (ri1δi<0 − qi1δi≥0)
]
subject to Eδ1,...,δn
[∑
i∈I
δi
]
≥M.
(5)
That is, the DRP aims to find an optimal vector of per-
unit rewards r∗ that minimizes the expected total amount
of payments disbursed to the users while satisfying the
constraint that the expected sum of reductions exceeds M .
III. DEMAND RESPONSE MECHANISM
To find an approximation to the solution of (5), the utility
needs to elicit user i’s private type θi with an incentive
compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) mechanism.
IR guarantees that participation in the mechanism, provided
users act rationally, results in an expected payoff that is at
least as large as in the case of non-participation (outside
option), which is zero in our case (2). IC is required to ensure
that users report their types truthfully to the DRP.
A. Mechanism Design Basics
We first introduce basic notation relevant to our problem.
Let θ denote the collection of types (θ1, . . . ,θn), where
each θi ∈ Θi ∀ i ∈ I is drawn from its type space Θi.
It is assumed that θ is drawn from a commonly known joint
distribution F defined on the product space Θ = ×ni=1Θi.
Each agent is assumed to seek expected utility maximization
of her utility function ui(y,θi) : Y ×Θi 7→ R, where y =
(d, r) ∈ Y = {0, 1}n×Rn+ is the collective choice consisting
of the vector of allocation decisions d and the vector of
rewards r. The social choice function f(θ) : Θ 7→ Y maps
a particular collection of types θ to y.
Let Si, . . . ,Sn denote the strategy spaces of users i ∈ I.
A realized strategy vector s ∈ ×ni=1Si defines an outcome
function g(s1, . . . , sn) : ×ni=1Si 7→ Y . Together they define a
mechanism Γ = (S1, . . . ,Sn, g(·)), which transforms users’
strategies into a social choice function through the outcome
function g(·). (Γ, F, {ui}ni=1) defines a Bayesian Game with
payoffs ui(g(s1, . . . , sn),θi) and strategies si : Θi 7→ Si.
The revelation principle [18] allows us to focus on direct
mechanisms, i.e. Si = Θi and g(s1, . . . , sN ) ≡ g(θ) =
f(θ), which is the well-known fact that any equilibrium of
any mechanism is identical to an equilibrium of a direct
mechanism, provided truthful reporting. We focus on the
dominant strategy equilibrium:
Definition 1 (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE)). A
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium is given by
θi = arg max
zi∈Θi
Ezi [ui(f(zi, z−i),θi)] ∀i ∈ I, z ∈ Θ (6)
That is, if the supremum of user i’s expected utility ui is
achieved with truthful reporting s∗i (θi) = θi, regardless
of other users reports z−i ∈ Θ−i, then the social choice
function f(·) is dominant strategy incentive compatible.
B. Timing, User Types, and Reward Calculation
The DR mechanism unfolds as follows:
• The users i ∈ I discover their types θ1, . . . ,θn. The
baselines xˆ1, . . . , xˆn become common knowledge.
• The users reveal their types {zi}ni=1 to the DRP, where
zi not necessarily corresponds to the true type θi.
• The DRP implements the collective choice f(z) = y =
(d, r) through the mechanism Γ.
• Users observe f(z) and adjust their consumption ac-
cording to (3) and di, ri.
For better visualization, Figure 2 depicts these steps.
θ and xˆ
materialize
t = 0
Users reveal
types z
to DRP
t = 1
DRP implements
f(z) = (d, r),
informs users
t = 2
Users’ consumptions
in response to
y materialize
t = 3
Fig. 2: DR Mechanism Timeline
An important observation is that, after the implementation
of f(z) at t = 2, the DRP calculates its expected profit
E[Π] and the expected payments disbursed to each user i.
Due to the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem [19], we do not
perform any ex-post analysis on the realized consumptions
x(r) at t = 3.
To model the fact that users’ base electricity consump-
tion is often driven by habits rather than rational profit-
maximization [20], we assume the user-specific intercept x¯i
to be drawn from an a-priori defined distribution G with
characteristic parameters ξi encoded in user i’s private type.
ξi itself is distributed according to the joint distribution
Fξ, and so x¯i is a compound random variable. The slope,
however, is assumed to be explicitly known for each user and
drawn from distribution Fα. Thus θi = (αi ∼ Fα, ξi ∼ Fξ),
where x¯i ∼ Gξi ∼ Gξi∼Fξ . All distributions have support
on R+. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. The types (αi, ξi) are drawn from indepen-
dent, absolutely continuous distributions Fα and Fξ. Each
component k in ξi is independently drawn from the marginal
distribution Fξk s.t. Fξ = Fξ1 · . . . · Fξm , where m is the
dimension of ξi. G is pairwise independent of Fα and Fξ.
User i’s expected utility µi, given the realized types αi and
ξi, allocation di = 1, and reward ri, is obtained by taking
the expectation of (2) with respect to the random variable
x¯i ∼ Gξi :
µi(di = 1, ri) =
∫
R+
ui(αi, ri, x) dGξi(x), (7)
which is strictly monotonically increasing in reward ri, cf.
(2). Letting G denote the CDF of G, (7) for ri = 0 becomes
µi(di = 1, ri = 0) = qi
[
xˆi(1− G(xˆi))−
∫ ∞
xˆi
x dGξi(x)
]
which is negative. Hence, there is a unique r˜i such that
µi(di = 1, r˜i) = 0, i.e. the unique threshold reward level
for which user i’s expected utility is zero. We approximate
r˜i with Newton’s method, exploiting the fact µi is monoton-
ically increasing in ri. Due to the same property, any reward
ri ≥ r˜i fulfills the IR constraint as µi(di = 0) = 0 (Eq. 2).
C. Mechanism for Demand Response
We now present the Demand Response Mechanism:
1) Each user announces her private type zi ∈ Θi to
the DRP. We will later show that this mechanism is
incentive compatible, so that users report their types
truthfully. In the following, we thus let zi = θi.
2) The DRP calculates the unique r˜i for each user based
on the reports θi with Newton’s method on (7).
3) The DRP sorts {r˜i | i ∈ I} in ascending order. Call
this sorted set R.
4) The DRP implements the social choice y as follows:
jmax = min
j
{
j ∈ N+
∣∣∣ j∑
i=1
δi(r˜j |θi) ≥M
}
(8a)
j(i) = min
k
k ∈ N+ ∣∣∣
k∑
s=1,s6=i
δs(r˜k|θs) ≥M

∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , jmax} =: T (8b)
ri ← r˜j(i) ≥ r˜i ∀ i ∈ T (8c)
The allocation decision and the reward vector are
d = (1, . . . , 1,0n−jmax), (9a)
r = (r˜j(1), . . . , r˜j(jmax),0n−jmax). (9b)
In the above mechanism, δi(r˜j |θi) denotes the expected
reduction of user i, given the reward level r˜j conditional
on truthful reporting zi = θi, which is computed by taking
the expectation on (1) and (3) with respect to ξi.
The mechanism first determines the set of targeted users T
by selecting the smallest index jmax ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that
the sum of expected reductions of users 1 through jmax, if
each user were given the reward r˜jmax , exceeds the desired
aggregate amount M (8a). Notice that since the set R is
sorted in ascending order, r˜jmax ≥ r˜i ∀ i ≤ jmax. Because
µi(di = 1, ri) is strictly monotonically increasing in ri, all
targeted users will respond to incentive level r˜jmax .
Next, the reward for each user i ∈ T is determined by
running the same exact mechanism (8a) on I \ i, i.e. the set
of all users excluding i (8b). Denote the user with the largest
threshold reward r˜j(i) in this new set with j(i). This reward
level is then assigned to user i (8c).
In summary, the first jmax users (8a) with the smallest
threshold rewards r˜i are offered user-specific unit-rewards
((8b), (8c)). The remaining n− jmax users are not targeted.
Lastly, to ensure that the mechanism returns a valid index
jmax, we restrict M to the range
[
0,
∑n−1
i=2 δi(r˜n−1|θi)
]
. If
M exceeds this range, there are not enough users to achieve
expected aggregate reduction M on the given n users.
Theorem 1. If M ∈
[
0,
∑n−1
i=2 δi(r˜n−1|θi)
]
, the DR Mech-
anism terminates. The mechanism fulfills the IR constraint.
Truthful reporting, i.e. s∗i (θi) = θi, establishes a DSE.
Since truthful reporting establishes a DSE (Theorem 1),
Mechanism I is also IC, due to the revelation principle [21].
Remark 1. Due to the fact that {(αi, ξi)}ni=1 are realiza-
tions of continuous random variables, no ties need to be
broken in (8a), (8b) and the sorting of the users into R,
because identical threshold rewards r˜i = r˜j , i, j ∈ I, i 6= j,
only occur with probability zero.
The presented mechanism runs in O(n log n) time, as it
takes O(n log n) time to create the sorted list R˜ and log n
time to determine the correct index jmax (8a) with a binary
search on all possible values of j = 1, . . . , n. Once jmax has
been found, we have to determine the reward level for each
user by running the same mechanism again, which amounts
to O(n log n). This yields a runtime of O(n log n).
Remark 2. This mechanism is motivated by the classic
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism [21], as it allocates an
“items” (in our case reward) to the “highest” bidders (in
our case lowest threshold reward levels).
D. Numerical Example
Table I lists threshold rewards r˜i and reduction functions
of 6 hypothetical users in a synthetic user pool. The linearity
of {δi}6i=1 is assumed for ease of exposition. Let M = 4.3.
Pool of Users
User# 1 2 3 4 5 6
r˜i 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.1
δi(ri) 1 + r1 2 +
r2
2
1 + r3
3
2 + r4
4
1 + r5
2
1 + r6
5
TABLE I: Example User Characteristics
(8a) selects jmax = 2 such that δ1(r˜2) + δ2(r˜2) = (1 +
1) + (2 + 12 · 1) = 4.5 ≥ M . Thus T = {1, 2}. (8b) then
determines j(1) and j(2) by solving (8a) on T \1 and T \2,
respectively:
• For i = 1, j(1) = 4 because δ2(r˜4)+δ3(r˜4)+δ4(r˜4) =
(2 + 1.8/2) + (1 + 1.8/3) + (2 + 1.8/4) = 6.95 ≥
M . Indeed, j(1) 6= 3 because δ2(r˜3) + δ3(r˜3) = (2 +
1.5/2) + (1 + 1.5/3) = 4.25 < M .
• For i = 2, j(2) = 4 because δ1(r˜4)+δ3(r˜4)+δ4(r˜4) =
(1 + 1.8) + (1 + 1.8/3) + (2 + 1.8/4) = 6.85 ≥ M .
Indeed, j(2) 6= 3 because δ1(r˜3)+δ3(r˜3) = (1+1.5)+
(1 + 1.5/3) = 4 < M
User 1 and 2’s rewards therefore are r˜4, see (8c).
IV. EFFECT OF BASELINE “GAMING”
By expanding user i’s reduction of consumption (1),
δi = (xˆi − x¯i) + x¯i(1− e−αiri) =: δBLi + δri , (10)
it becomes clear that the measured reduction δi of user i
is comprised of two components: δBLi , which captures the
difference between the baseline xˆi and the base consump-
tion (i.e. the consumption with no reward), and the actual
reduction δri due to the elasticity of user i in response to the
reward level ri. δBLi is a “virtual reduction”, which, if pos-
itive (negative), represents the amount of falsely measured
reduction (increase). From an economic perspective, δBLi > 0
results in falsely allocated credit from the utility to the DRP
as well as from the DRP to users i. On the contrary, δBLi < 0
is synonymous with a misallocated monetary transfer from
user i to the utility as well as from the utility to the DRP
proportional to the amount of |δBLi |. To diminish the effect
of virtual reduction, the baseline estimates should become as
precise as possible. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 4. The random variables αi and ξi for different
points in time are independent.
Assumption 4 excludes the possibility of baseline manip-
ulation [22], which captures the fact that users can inflate
or deflate their baseline, given the knowledge of future DR
events, in order to increase their calculated reduction δi (1).
For example, a user can increase her expected utility (2) for
a DR event by consciously over-consuming prior to the DR
event so as to increase the baseline xˆi, which results in a
higher payment ri · [xˆi − xi]+, despite having a zero actual
reduction δri . However, as DR events are difficult to forecast,
the mild assumption that users do not consciously manipulate
their baseline justifies Assumption 4, that is, users consume
independently of the past and the future.
As a result, averaging 10 recent observations for weekdays
(or 4 for weekends and holidays), excluding hours of past DR
events, results in an unbiased estimate of the mean consump-
tion xi, but with considerable variance around xi. From a
theoretical perspective, the baseline estimate approaches zero
variance as the number of previous observations to estimate
xˆi goes to infinity, due to the Central Limit Theorem and
Assumption 4. In the next Section, we simulate the effect
of more precise baseline estimates on the quantity of virtual
reductions δBLi .
As the analysis of the economic implications of this
virtual baseline reduction component is outside the scope
of the paper, the reader is referred to [23], which explicitly
characterizes the magnitude of marginal competitive rents in
California’s wholesale electricity market, and [6], [7], where
the authors suggest alternative baselining methodologies
based on Machine Learning, which weaken the effect of such
virtual reductions.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we simulate the presented mechanism and
the effect of virtual reductions stemming from imperfect
baseline predictions. We utilize hourly smart meter data from
1,000 residential customers serviced by the three largest
utilities in California (Pacific Gas & Electric, San Diego Gas
& Energy, and Southern California & Edison).
A. Approximation of Base Consumption
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the hourly base con-
sumptions between 5-6 pm in the absence of DR events of a
selected user. The restriction to 5-6 pm is arbitrarily chosen.
For a more thorough analysis, we would have to analyze all
24 hours of the day separately.
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
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0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
E
m
pi
ri
ca
l
P
D
F
Log-Normal Empirical Distribution
Fit
Empirical
Fig. 3: Lognormal Consumption Distribution Fit for Selected User, 5-6 pm
It is found that the base consumption x¯i can be approxi-
mated with a log-normal distribution, whose density
N (log x) = 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (log(x− `)− µ)
2
2σ2
)
(11)
is fully parameterized by the shape σ > 0, scale s = eµ > 0,
and location parameter `. As (11) has support on (`,∞), the
location ` denotes the lower bound on the support of the
base consumption distribution.
Fitting a log-normal distribution to the hourly consump-
tions between 5-6 pm across all users yields a distribution
of the compound statistics ξi = (σ, s, `), given below:
x¯i ∼ Lognormal(σ, s, `) σ ∼ N (µn, σn)
s ∼ Cauchy(`c, sc) ` ∼ Exponential(λe)
That is, the shape parameter σ is best approximated with a
Gaussian distribution N (µn, σn), the location ` by a Cauchy
distribution parameterized by location `c and scale parameter
sc, and the scale parameter s by an exponential distribution
with parameter λe. Figure 4 shows the distribution of these
compound statistics across all 1,000 users.
B. Performance of DR Mechanism
We compare the DR Mechanism (8a)-(8c) to the hypothet-
ical case of an omniscient DRP, which knows {(αi, ξi)}ni=1.
Despite this being an unrealistic scenario, it provides a near-
optimal approximation of the minimum payment disbursed
to the users necessary to elicit a target reduction of M .
Given the sorted listR of user-specific threshold rewards, the
omniscient DRP implements the social choice yo = (do, ro)
as follows:
jo = min
j
{
j ∈ N+
∣∣∣ j∑
i=1
δi(r˜i) ≥M
}
(12a)
T o = {1, . . . , jo} (12b)
roi = r˜i ∀ i ∈ T o (12c)
do = (1, . . . , 1,0n−jo) (12d)
That is, the DRP determines the smallest index jo to obtain
the desired expected aggregate reduction M (12a) where
each user {1, . . . , jo} is given their individual threshold
reward r˜i (12c). These are the targeted users (12b), (12d).
Due to {(αi, ξi)}ni=1 being publicly known, users are
unable to extract information rent from the DRP, which is
the payment to the users to elicit their private information
[24]. Hence, the DRP can offer targeted users their threshold
reward r˜i, which keeps users at an expected utility (7) of
zero. To guarantee user participation, the DRP has to offer
the reward level r˜i + ε to each user i ∈ T o, where ε is an
arbitrarily small positive number.
Figure 5 compares the DR Mechanism (8a)-(8c) to the
omniscient allocation with respect to the number of targeted
users (left) and the total amount of rewards disbursed (right)
on n = 500 users whose parameters ξi = (σi, si, `i)
are sampled from the fitted distributions in Figure 4. As
expected, the omniscient allocation is more economical at
eliciting a particular aggregate reduction target M due to
the lack of private user information, namely about 45% better
than the DR mechanism. However, it needs to target more
customers as each customer in the omniscient case receives
a smaller reward level than in the DR mechanism.
C. Virtual Reductions
Figure 6 shows the total reduction
∑
i∈T δi of all targeted
users and its components
∑
i∈T δ
BL
i and
∑
i∈T δ
r
i as a
function of M for n = 500 users, q = 5, and elasticities
{αi}ni=1 drawn from a uniform distribution with support
[0.05, 0.06]. The baseline computed with a particular number
x of previous days taken into consideration is calculated as
the mean of x randomly drawn samples from the empirical
consumption distribution (11).
As can be seen from Figure 6, almost the entire reduction
is attributed to the baseline component
∑
i∈T δ
BL
i for small
M . With larger values of M , the contribution of
∑
i∈T δ
BL
i
decreases marginally and finally starts decreasing. This can
be explained by the fact that sorting users in R tends to
put users with the highest δBLi towards the start of the array,
while those with the lowest (and negative) δBLi bunch up
at the end of R. Consequently, as more users are assigned
to T , the sum of baseline reductions decreases. The actual
reduction
∑
i∈T δ
r
i increases exponentially with the number
of users targeted, because as more users are assigned to T ,
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Fig. 4: Compound Statistics for Lognormal Consumption Distribution. Left: Shape, Middle: Location, Right: Scale
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the per-unit reward levels also increase, which results in a
superlinear growth of
∑
i∈T δ
r
i .
For increasing numbers of baseline averaging components,
that is, the number of previous days to calculate the baseline,
the variance of the baseline estimate x¯i − xˆi decreases, and
so the virtual reductions decrease. For the limiting case of a
perfect baseline, the virtual reductions are zero.
Finally, Figure 7 depicts the total amount of payments the
DRP has to make to the users for varying baseline accuracies
in the range M ∈ [0, 100], where virtual payments have the
largest effect (see Figure 6). For more inaccurate baselines
(fewer number of averaging days), the DRP has to pay users
less as it can exploit the virtual reduction component.
VI. CONCLUSION
We modeled Residential Demand Response with a Mecha-
nism Design Framework where a Demand Response Provider
asks a subset of its customers under contract to reduce elec-
tricity consumption temporarily in exchange for a monetary
reward. Each user’s consumption in response to a per-unit
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Fig. 7: Payments to Users to Elicit M for varying Baseline Accuracies.
reduction incentive is modeled as a logarithmic demand
curve where the intercept and the slope are private infor-
mation of users. While each user has a fixed slope, the user-
specific intercept, which corresponds to the consumption
given no incentive, is modeled as a realization of a compound
random variable, capturing the fact that users often do not
consume electricity in a profit-maximizing fashion, but rather
are following habits, and hence have no explicit utility
function. To make an informed choice about the magnitude
of reductions in response to incentives to achieve an a-priori
defined aggregate reduction target M , the Demand Response
Provider asks for residential customers’ bids to elicit their
private information. Reductions are measured against a coun-
terfactual estimate of the consumption in the hypothetical
case of no DR event, which in this paper is the “10-in-
10”-baseline employed by the California Independent System
Operator. Since this baseline is plagued by high variance, the
Demand Response Provider can exploit “virtual reductions”
emanating from high baseline estimates, which are false-
positive reductions despite the users not having reduced, but
whose role diminishes as the baseline becomes more precise.
The Demand Response mechanism is validated on hourly
smart meter data of residential customers in California.
Our analysis is an initial step towards quantifying eco-
nomic implications of Demand Response on a residential
level. While we approximated users’ base demand (i.e. in
the absence of incentives) reasonably well with existing
smart meter data, the price elasticity of users in response
to incentives is unknown, a fact that is complicated by the
fundamental problem of causal inference. Thus, to further
validate our analysis on real data, credible parameters for
users’ slope of the demand curve would be necessary.
Lastly, extending the single period analysis employed
in this paper towards a dynamical problem, which allows
for baseline manipulation of users, is a logical next step.
Comparing the “10-in-10”-baseline to improved baseline
estimates obtained with Machine Learning techniques, which
exploit serial correlation of consumption time series, would
shed further light on the economics of Residential Demand
Response.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Individual Rationality: Notice first that each user i ∈ T
is given the reward r˜j(i), where j(i) ≥ jmax ≥ i. The first
inequality is a consequence of (8b), which for each i ∈ T
re-runs (8a) on the subset of users I \ i. Thus, to achieve the
aggregate reduction M on users I \i, where each user would
be given the highest threshold reward of the targeted group,
requires more users to be targeted than running the same
mechanism on I. Hence j(i) ≥ jmax. The second inequality
is due to the fact that R˜ is sorted in ascending order, which
also implies
E[ui(r˜j(i)|θi)] ≥ E[ui(r˜i|θi)] = 0.
due to the monotonically increasing property of the expected
utility in the reward. Thus, participation in the mechanism
and being assigned to T results in a non-negative expected
utility, compared to a zero utility for non-participation. On
the other hand, users i 6∈ T receive a zero payment and so
the expected utility is zero.
Incentive Compatibility: To show that the DR mechanism
is incentive compatible, first note that the reward level r(i)
for each i ∈ T is determined independently of user i’s bid
zi. For each i 6∈ T , user i is not given a reward. To show IC,
we must therefore iterate through the following two cases:
1) i ∈ T for zi = θi, i.e. user i is assigned treatment
with truthful reporting. This implies user i is given
reward r˜j(i), which results in a positive expected utility.
Now suppose user i had reported zi 6= θi. Then either
the user is still assigned treatment, in which case her
reward remains the same, or the user is not assigned
treatment, in which case her reward reduces to zero.
Thus, misreporting could lead to a zero utility when
the user could have had a positive expected utility.
2) i 6∈ T for zi = θi, i.e. user i is outside the treatment
group with truthful reporting. If user i had reported
zi 6= θi, then either the user is still outside the
treatment group, which results in a zero utility, or the
user is now in the treatment group. In the latter case,
note that user i is assigned reward r˜jmax , as jmax is
exactly the solution to (8b). Finally, because r˜jmax < r˜i
(due to i 6∈ T ), the expected utility turns negative.
Thus, misreporting does not improve the expected
utility, but could lead to a negative expected utility
when the user could have had a zero utility.
Combining the two cases above, it follows that misreporting
the true type either yields a utility that is identical to or less
than the utility in case of truthful reporting. Therefore the
maximum expected utility is attained with truthful reporting,
zi = θi, and so the DR mechanism is incentive compatible.
Lastly, to show that the mechanism terminates if 0 ≤M ≤∑n−1
i=2 δi(r˜n−1|θi), simply notice that j(i) ≤ n ∀ i ∈ T
(8b) because δ1(r˜k|θ1) ≥ δi(r˜k|θi), i ≤ k ≤ j(i) due to
the monotonically increasing property of (1) and (7). Hence
running the mechanism on T \ i always satisfies M .
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